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NOTE

THE TORTURE MEMOS:
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN A SHIFT IN U.S.
POLICY TOWARDS A CONDEMNATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE USE OF TORTURE

[In the United States, the use of torture] is categorically denouncedas
a matter ofpolicy and as a tool of state authority.... No official of the
government,federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized
to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any
official condone or tolerate torture in any form.... No exceptional
circumstances may be invoked as a justification of torture. U.S. law
contains no provision permitting otherwise prohibited acts of torture
or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment to be
employed on grounds of exigent circumstances.., or on ordersfrom a
The United States is
superior officer or public authority ....
committed to the full and effective implementation of its obligations
under the Convention [Against Torture] throughout its territory.
-1999 Initial Report of the United States
to the U.N. Committee Against Torture.

1. U.S. Department of State, Initial Report of the United States of America to the UN
Committee Against Torture, Oct. 15, 1999 available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/
human rights/torture intro.html.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

"On the dogmas of religion, as distinguished from moral principles,
all mankind,from the beginning of the world to this day, have been
quarreling, fighting, burning and torturing one another, for
abstractions unintelligible to themselves and to all others, and
absolutely beyond the comprehension of the human mind ,,2
-Thomas Jefferson
In the years following the terrorist attacks on New York City and
Washington D.C., as well as the thwarted terrorist attempt that led to the
destruction of a fourth airplane in Pennsylvania, there has been a
dramatic international focus on terrorism. 3 Nations are increasingly
searching for ways to protect themselves and their people; 4 but what
boundaries on protection are being set? At what point will a nation-state
cross the line of permissible protection?
International law and policy accurately reflect the changes in the
nature of the law today. 5 Customary law, international treaties, and
domestic laws have been widely accepted as explicitly prohibiting the
use of torture by a government, or anyone acting on behalf of a
government. 6 Immediately following the attacks, Congress passed a joint
resolution authorizing President Bush to "use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks..., or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations, or persons."' In applying the
permissible scope of this authorization, two memoranda [hereinafter
"torture memos"] which are the focus of this Note: (1) The August 1,
2002 Department of Justice Memorandum Re: Standards of Conduct for

11,

1816), available at

2.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Matthew Carey (Nov.

5.

See generally MARK W. JANIS & JOHIN E. NOYES, CASES & COMMENTARY ON

4
http://memory.loc.gov/master/mss/mtj/mtj 1/0 9/0600/0635.jpg.
3. See infra
notes 5-7.
4. Id. The United States, for example, enacted Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.
L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 2004 (2001), discussed infra note 7.

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-19 (West Group 2d ed. 2001).
6.
7.
(2001).

See infra notes 39-42.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
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Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 8 and (2) The March 6,
2003 Department of Defense Working Group Report Re: Detainee
Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal,
Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations, 9 suggested that
torturing a suspected terrorist in the hopes of preventing future attacks
may not only be morally permissible, but may also be legal.'0
Furthermore, those being detained by the United States government
(who are also the ones that would inevitably be tortured) are not allowed
to challenge the reasons for their detainment since they are "enemy
combatants" and not prisoners of war.
These documents were just two of a series of memoranda and other
documents, originating from the White House, Pentagon, and the Justice
Department concerning the Bush Administration's interrogation policies,
released by the White House on June 22, 2004."1 In sum, these
documents all dealt with the permissible bounds of preventing terrorism.
The series of documents are described by White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales as
two distinct sets of documents, those that were generated by
government lawyers to explore the limits of the legal landscape as to
what the Executive Branch can do within the law and the Constitution
as an abstract matter; [and those] that reflect the actual decisions issued
the
by the President and senior administration officials directing
12
policies that our military would actually be obliged to follow.
In December of 2004, nearly 30 months after the publishing of the
original controversial document, the Justice Department released a
revised version of its August 1, 2002 Memorandum [hereinafter "Levin

8. See generally Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to
Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002

Memo] (on file with author).
9. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN
TUE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT] (on file

with author).
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. The National Security Archive, The InterrogationDocuments: Debating U.S. Policy and
Methods, George Washington University, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127 (July 13, 2004); see also Pace Law School, Memos and Reports on the
Detainees, Pace University
Library, available at
Treatment
of Prisoners and
http://www.library.law.pace.edu/govemment/detaineememos.htm (last visited May 25, 2005).
12. The National Security Archive, supranote 11.
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Memorandum"]. 13 According to the Justice Department, this 17 page
'' 5
revision 14 "supersedes the August 2002 Memorandum in its entirety.
However, the reasons for the Levin Memorandum, the "stripped down"
language implemented throughout it, and the timing of its release, may16
be called into question as trying to achieve some ulterior political goal.
In effect, despite these new assertions set forth in the revised
memorandum, the United States government has not changed its position
regarding torture or the detainment of prisoners. As this Note will point
out, it can be argued that the original memoranda set up a legal
framework leading to the belief that torture could be legal, or at the very
least, excusable.' 7 The Levin Memorandum supports this argument.
The Levin Memorandum flatly states that torture violates both
United States law and international norms.' 8 It repudiated the 2002
Memorandum's interpretation of what constitutes torture and defined
torture much more broadly. 19 The narrow characterization of torture was
one of the major shortcomings of the 2002 Department of Justice
Memorandum. 20 The Levin Memorandum has further diverged from the
original August 2002 Memorandum by finding that an interrogator
possesses sufficient intent to commit torture, and hence is subject to
criminal prosecution, if he is aware that his actions will result in crossing
the threshold level of "severe pain. 21 U.S. personnel cannot contend that
their interrogation methods were motivated by national security needs
13.

See generally Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to

James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum Dec.
30, 2004] (on file with author).
14.

Id.

15. Id. at2.
16.

See generally Human Rights First, New Torture Memo an Improvement but Raises More

Questions (Jan. 6, 2005), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005_alerts/
etn_0106_levin.htm (last visited May 25, 2005).
17. Associated Press, Bush Admin. Redefines

'Torture' (Dec. 31, 2004), available at

http://cbsnewyork.com/topstories/topstories-story_366081649.html (last visited May 25, 2005).
18. Levin Memorandum Dec. 30, 2004, supra note 13, at 2. Footnote 2 of the memorandum
briefly discusses the suggestion that an international prohibition on the use of torture has reached
the status ofjus cogens. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 reps. n.5 (1987).

19. Levin Memorandum Dec. 30, 2004, supranote 13, at 2. "[W]e disagree with statements in
the August 2002 Memorandum limiting 'severe' pain under the statute to 'excruciating and
agonizing' pain, or to pain 'equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying series physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death."' Id.(citations omitted); see
also Human Rights First, supra note 16.

20. Human Rights First, supra note 16 (stating that the new Torture Memo, by reversing
portions of the controversial 2002 Department of Justice Memorandum, is an improvement but still
leaves many questions unanswered).
21.

Id.
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and cannot justify torture after telling the detainee that he could avoid it
by cooperating with interrogators.22
Elisa Massimino, Washington Director of Human Rights First, has
called the Levin Memorandum "a remarkable admission of error on the
part of the Administration" and has further found it "reject[s] the August
2002 memo's strained interpretations of torture, and thereby call[s] into
question the legality of the U.S. government's interrogation policy over
the last two years." 23 That being said, the Levin Memorandum has failed
to reject some of the August 2002 Memorandum's most controversial
assertions: The President is unconstrained by any act of Congress
criminalizing torture, and United States officials have legal defenses
against criminal liability that may arise from the use of torture.24
The Levin Memorandum reaffirms that the President has complete
discretion in his actions as Commander-in-Chief. 25 Furthermore, despite
offering a new definition of torture, which the Office of Legal Counsel
believes is more in tune with the aims of Congress' enactment of the
obligations of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter
"Torture Convention"] into §§ 2340-2340A,2 6 the Memorandum argued
that under this revised definition of torture, no prior Office of Legal
Counsel opinions would be different.27 This new Memorandum stated,
"[w]hile [the Office of Legal Counsel has] identified various
disagreements with the August 2002 Memorandum, [they] have
reviewed [the] prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of
detainees and do not believe that any of their conclusions would 'be
28
different under the standards set forth in this [Levin] memorandum.
So, although the Levin Memorandum offers a more logical reading of
the federal torture statute29 and international interpretations of torture
under both customary international law and treaty law, it still does not
address the various sources of law and other international issues that
apply to the detention and interrogation of detainees. 30 As pointed out by
22. Associated Press, supra note 17.
23. Human Rights First, supra note 16.
24. Id.; see also Associated Press, supranote 17.
25. Human Rights First, supra note 16.
26. See generally Levin Memorandum Dec. 30, 2004, supra note 13, at 4-17.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 2 n.8.
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000); see infra note 62.
30. For example, Alberto Gonzales opined in a January 25, 2002 memorandum that the
Geneva Conventions and the War Crimes Act did not apply to the treatment of Al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, to President George W. Bush, Re:
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al
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Human Rights First, "the Levin memo evades [these discussions on the
President's Commander-In-Chief Powers and the Geneva Convention's
right to a tribunal], characterizing the arguments as 'unnecessary' and
'inconsistent' with the President's statement in July of 2004 condemning
torture."'" Assuming the Levin Memorandum supersedes the August
2002 Memorandum in its entirety, this leaves a logical question; how
does the administration now feel about some of the most controversial
issues discussed
in the August 2002 Memorandum, but omitted from this
32
revision?
So what were the real reasons behind the release of this Levin
Memorandum? Perhaps the most obvious is timing. The memoranda was
dated and released less than one week before the Senate Judiciary
Committee was to consider President Bush's nomination of his chief
White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales, to replace John Ashcroft as
Attorney General.33 The controversial August 2002 Memorandum was
prepared for Gonzalez, and many Democrats said they would question
Gonzales closely on memoranda he wrote or commissioned that appear
to justify torture.3 4 The release of the Levin Memorandum also coincides
with continuing revelations of possible detainee abuse contained in a
series of memoranda, emails, and other documents from FBI agents
uncovered in an American Civil Liberties Union lawsuit. 35 The lawsuit
alleges wrongdoing on behalf of the Defense Department during
interrogation proceedings.3 6 The discoveries made within these
documents have directly led to another lawsuit filed in March of 2005 in
federal court in Illinois.37
Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002). The newly released Levin Memorandum does not address

this issue, nor does it answer whether or not the Bush Administration still takes this legal position.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Human Rights First, supra note 16.
Id.
Associated Press, supra note 17.
Id.

35. Id.The ACLU and other human rights groups have compiled over 23,000 pages of
documents concerning torture through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit. Press Release, David
Danzig & Sean Crowley, Human Rights First, ACLU and Human Rights First Sue Defense
Secretary

Rumsfeld

Over

U.S.

Torture

Policies,

Mar.

2005,

available

at

http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2005_alerts/etn_0301 _lit.htm.
36.
37.

Associated Press, supra note 17.
This lawsuit, All v. Rumsfeld, is on behalf of eight men who were subject to torture under

Secretary Rumsfeld's command. They are seeking a court order declaring Secretary Rumsfeld's
actions violated the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes and international law. The plaintiffs in the
suit were all incarcerated in U.S. detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan where they allege they
were subjected to torture including severe beatings, cutting with knives, sexual humiliation, sexual
assault, mock executions, death threats, and restraint in contorted and excruciating positions. None
of the men were ever charged with a crime and subsequently have all have been released. Danzig &
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Despite this new Levin Memorandum and the dramatic reversal in
opinion articulated by the administration, there is no evidence that either
the legal or political strategy of the United States has changed in regards
to its assertions presented in the original 2002 and 2003 Memoranda
about the right to permissibly use torture or the status of those being
detained by the United States in the "War on Terror." These original
Memoranda conflict with the United States' international and domestic
obligations concerning the prohibition against torture as set forth in the
Torture Convention. In order to demonstrate this, Part II of this Note will
focus on the international obligations to refrain from torture. Part III will
examine the two original Memoranda and the conflict that exists
between the assertions they set forth and the international law that
prohibits the use of torture. Part IV of this Note will evaluate the two
original Memoranda and examine whether or not the United States is
abiding by the Torture Convention. Part IV will also discuss who would
be held responsible for an act of torture, assuming the United States has
indeed violated its obligations. Part V of this Note will briefly explore
two justifications for the use of torture that are relevant to the issues
presented in the Torture Memoranda, as well as what the subsequent
effects would be from such a change in international policy. Finally, Part
VI will sum up and offer final thoughts on the issues and legal questions
raised by this Note.
II.

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO REFRAIN FROM TORTURE

"'[Torture]is a wonderful way of getting false concessions out of
innocent people. It is a terrible way of getting the truth out of guilty
people.
-Tom Malinowski

Crowley, supra note 35; see also ACLU, The Lawsuit Against Donald Rumsfeld over U.S. Torture
Policies, available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17572&c=206 (last
modified March 1, 2005). The complaint alleged violations of national and international laws,
including: the Fifth Amendment due process clause; Fifth and Eighth Amendment prohibitions on
cruel and unusual punishment; the law of nations' prohibition against torture included in the Torture
Convention; the doctrine of command responsibility; and the third and fourth Geneva Conventions
instructions on the treatment of detainees. Press Release, ACLU, Fact Sheet: Legal Claims in Ali v.
available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/Safeand
1, 2005)
(March
Rumsfeld
Free.cfm?ID=l 7590&c=207.
38. Should U.S. Use Torture on Terror Suspects?, CNN.com (Mar. 4, 2003) (transcript of a
discussion on the television program Crossfire, hosted by Paul Begala and Robert Novak, on March
3, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITiCS/03/04/cf.opinion.torture/index.html.
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The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment

A.

Nearly every major instrument that promotes or protects human
rights, as well as codifications of international humanitarian law,
condemns torture. 39 The most prominent international agreement
prohibiting the use of torture 40 is the Torture Convention. 4' This
document prohibits the use of torture and requires the punishment or
extradition of anyone who commits torture within a signatory's
territorial jurisdiction.42 The United Nations Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was
adopted by the general assembly of the United Nations on December 10,
1984, and entered into force for the first twenty states which ratified it
on June 26, 1987. 43 Since then over 140 states have signed and/or
become parties to the Torture Convention. 4 The principal aim of the
convention was to strengthen existing prohibitions against torture by
implementing supportive measures that will be binding to states beyond
those that have become parties to the Convention.45 The Torture
Convention requires the signatories to implement effective measures and
safeguards in order to end torture within their territorial jurisdiction.46
The Torture Convention is comprised of 32 articles which are
broken down into three parts.4 7 The first 16 articles contained in Part 1
of the Convention are the most substantive parts of the document. 48

39.

Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime Under InternationalLaw, 67 ALB. L. REV.

427, 430 (2003). For example, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that no
person shall be subjected to torture or other forms of cruel and degrading punishment. G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Part I, at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948).
40. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS I
(Mar. 11, 2004).
41. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51(1984)

[hereinafter Torture Convention].
42. See generally id.
43. See generally J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1988).
44. GARCIA, supra note 40, at 1.
45. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 43, at 1. The authors explain that a common

misconception is that the Torture Convention aimed to outlaw torture. This assumption is incorrect
since torture was already outlawed internationally before the convention. Id.
46. See generally id; see also AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE
AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 2-3 (1999).
47. Torture Convention, supra note 41; see also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supranote 43, at 1-2.
48. Torture Convention, supra note 41.
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Article 2 states in relevant part that (1) each state shall take effective
means to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.4 9
(2) There is to be no circumstance that would justify torture
whatsoever.5 0 Specifically, a state of war or a threat of war, political
instability, or any other public emergency cannot be invoked as a reason
to allow torture. 51 (3) An order from a superior officer or other
authoritative figure cannot be invoked as a justification for the use of
torture. 52 Article 3 requires that no state party expel, return, or extradite a
person to another country where there are substantial grounds to believe
he would be subjected to torture.53 The Torture Convention defines
torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person ... by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. 54 This definition does not
include "pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions. ' '55 The Convention allows for no circumstances or
emergencies where torture could be permitted.56
On April 18, 1988, the United States signed the Torture
Convention, and in 1994 enacted the Torture Convention
Implementation Act. 57 The purpose of this act was to conform the
Torture Convention directives to the United States Criminal Code.58 The
Torture Convention was then ratified by the United States on October
21, 1994. 59 In ratifying the Torture Convention, the United States did so
subject to certain declarations, reservations, and understandings.60
Included in these reservations was the understanding that the Torture
Convention was not self-executing. 6 1 The State Department conducted
49. Id. pt. I, art. 2, § 1.
50. Id. §2.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 3.
53. Id. art. 3, § 1.
54. Id. art. 1, § 1.
55. Id. This phrase can be seen as a glaring loophole in the Torture Convention, allowing for
the exclusion of conduct when such conduct is claimed to be a result of lawful sanctions.
BOULESBAA, supranote 46, at 30.
56.

BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 43, at 47-49.

57. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 § 506, 108 Stat. 382,
463 (1994); GARCIA, supra note 40, at 4; see also van der Vyver, supra note 39, at 434.
58. van der Vyver, supra note 39, at 434.
59. GARCIA, supranote 40, at 4.
60. Id. For a more complete discussion of the relevant reservations, declarations and
understandings, see infra Part III.B.
61. GARCIA, supra note 40, at 4; see also Sen. Exec. Rpt. 101-30, Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification (1990).
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an independent analysis of the Torture Convention which President
Reagan included in his request to the Senate for ratification.62 In its
analysis, the State Department concluded that the Convention's
definition of torture was intended to be interpreted in a "relatively
limited fashion, corresponding to the common understanding of torture
as an extreme practice which is universally condemned., 63 The State
Department reasoned that "torture" under the Convention's definition
must be "severe" and that other forms of treatment such as police
brutality, "while deplorable, does not amount to 'torture' for purposes
of the Convention.64 Additionally, offenses of torture require a specific
intent to cause severe pain and suffering; "an act that results in
of pain and suffering is not torture
unanticipated and unintended severity
65
for purposes of the Convention.,
Subsequently, Congress codified the prohibitions of the Torture
Convention (subject to any declarations, reservations, and
understandings) in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.66 Section 2340 contains
the definition section and states in relevant part:
(1) "torture" means an act committed by a person acting under the
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental
pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful
sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control;
(2) "severe mental pain or suffering" means the prolonged mental
harm caused by or resulting from(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration
or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or

62. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, May 23, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No.
100-20, reprinted in 13857 U.S. Cong. Serial Set at iii (1990).
63. GARCIA, supra note 40, at 2 (citing President's Message to Congress Transmitting the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
supra note 62).
64. GARCIA, supra note 40, at 2.
65. Id.
66. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000).
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(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality; and
(3) "United States" includes all areas under the jurisdiction of the
United States including any of the places described in sections 5 and 7
of this title and section 46501(2) of title 49.67
Section 2340A outlines the offense of torture, jurisdiction to which
penalties for committing acts of torture will extend to, and criminalizes a
conspiracy to commit torture. It reads in relevant part:
(a) Offense.-Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts
to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction.-There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in
subsection (a) if(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective
of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
(c) Conspiracy.-A person who conspires to commit an offense under
this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the
penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the
offense, the
68
commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
Despite these international and domestic laws, it is evident in
examining the arguments stipulated in the two Memoranda that the
Office of Legal Counsel and the Department of Justice disregard these
principles. 69 Instead, they are advocating for a violation of international
law. Despite assertions to the contrary,7 ° the government continues to
implement a strategy that serves its own objectives of obtaining
information and detaining those who can provide it, in any way it deems

67. Id. § 2340.
68. Id. § 2340A.
69. See discussion infra Part III.A.
70. Press Release, White House, President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister of Hungary (June
22, 2004) (on file with author).
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acceptable, regardless of the legality of the methods or techniques used.
In other words, the United States is more or less adopting an "ends
justify the means" stratagem.
III.

THE ORIGINAL MEMORANDA-A CONFLICT BETWEEN
LAW AND THE MEMOS

"Torture is an atrocious violation of human dignity. It dehumanizes
both the victim and the perpetrator.The pain and terror deliberately
inflicted by one human being upon another leave permanent scars:
spines twisted by beatings, skulls dented by rifle butts, recurring
nightmares that keep the victims in constant fear. Freedom from
torture is afundamental human right that must be protected under all
circumstances. -71

-UN Secretary GeneralKofi Annan
72
Although there were numerous memoranda "officially released,,
two of the most controversial memoranda will be the focus of this

71. Press Release, UN Secretary-General, Freedom From Torture 'Fundamental Human
Right,' Says Secretary-General (June 25, 2001) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2001/sgsm7855.doc.htm.
72. Besides the officially released documents discussed supra notes 8-9, the following
documents were leaked to news media and have been widely reported and made available to the
public by various news media sources. These records were not included in the June 22 White House
release: (1) Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Asst. Attorney General, U. S. Dept. of
Justice, and John C. Yoo, Deputy Asst. Attorney General, U. S. Dept. of Justice, William J. Haynes,
General Counsel, Department of Defense, Re: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in
GuantanamoBay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001); (2) Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Asst. Attorney
General, U. S. Dept. of Justice and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, U. S. Dept. of Justice, to
William J. Haynes, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws
to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002); (3) Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, to
President George W. Bush, Re: Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisonersof
War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) (opposing the application of
Geneva Conventions to the Conflict in Afghanistan); (4) Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, U. S.
Dept. of State, to Counsel to the President and Asst. to the President for Nat'l Security Affairs, Re:
Draft DecisionMemorandum for the Presidenton the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the
Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan, 26, 2002); (5) Memorandum from William H. Taft, Legal Adviser,
Dept. of State, to Counsel to the President, Re: Comments on Your Paperon the Geneva Convention
(Feb. 2, 2002) (advising that the Geneva Conventions should apply); (6) Jan. 2004 Confidential
Report by the International Committee of the Red Cross on Detention in Iraq, see Press Release,
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Iraq: ICRC Explains Position over Detention Report and Treatment
of Prisoners (Aug. 5, 2004) (acknowledging the disclosure of the confidential report), at
GEN.
(7) MAI.
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5YRMYC?OpenDocument;
ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (Mar.

12, 2004) (detailing the findings of a Department of Defense investigation into the treatment of
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discussion. In 2002, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
advised the White House that torturing captured and detained al Qaeda
terrorists may be justified, and that intemational laws preventing the use
of torture may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations.7 3 Then, in
2003, a memorandum from a Defense Department working group
convened by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld employed much of the
legal thinking behind the 2002 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum to
develop new interrogation guidelines for detainees being held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.74
A.

The August 1, 2002 Department Of JusticeMemo-A Discussion

The first of these memoranda was written on August 1, 2002, by
the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 75 and was
entitled "Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C.
76
§ 2340-2340A." The memorandum was addressed to Alberto Gonzales
but was later dismissed by him as "irrelevant" as the controversy grew
around the illegality of techniques advocated and apparent lack of
morality. 77 The memorandum was originally written in response to a
request for the Office of Legal Counsel's views on the acceptable
standards of conduct for interrogations conducted outside the United
States under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as it applies to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A.7 8 Specifically, this memorandum was written at the
request of the Central Intelligence Agency, since they sought the
authority to conduct more aggressive forms of interrogation than were

prisoners at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq). Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by White
House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales, DoD General Counsel William Haynes, DoD Deputy

General Counsel Daniel Dell'Orto and Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence General Keith
Alexander

(June

22,

2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/

print/20040622-14.html.
73. Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justificationfor Use of Torture, WASH.
POST, June 8, 2004, at AOl; Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 1-2.
74. Dana Priest, Justice Dept. Memo Says Torture 'May Be Justified,' WASH. POST, June 13,
2004, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38894-2004Jun 13.html.

75. "The Office of Legal Counsel is the federal government's ultimate legal advisor." Often,
the federal government gives the most significant questions of law to the Office of Legal Counsel
for review. Id.
76. Alberto R. Gonzales is the Counsel to the President. See generally Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002
Memo, supra note 8.
77. Steve Andreasen, Beyond the Roots ofAbu Ghraib, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2004, at A23.
78. Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 1. As discussed supra notes 66-68, §§ 18
U.S.C. 2340-2340A was the statute that implemented the Torture Convention domestically.
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permitted at the time.7 9 The United States was looking to employ
methods of interrogation that arguably crossed the bounds of torture, but
wanted to examine the legal repercussions of such action.
The memorandum was signed by Jay Bybee, who was in charge of
the Office of Legal Counsel in 2002. By having Bybee's signature
appear on the document, additional authority was added to the
recommendations made in the memorandum, making it analogous to a
binding legal opinion on the interrogation methods that can be employed
80
by the federal government.
The memorandum is broken into six parts. Part I analyzed the text
and history of the criminal statute.8 1 Part II examined the Torture
Convention. 82 Part III explored judicial interpretation of the term
"torture" through civil suits under the Torture Victims Protection Act of
2000. Part IV explored the interpretation of torture in Western courts and
in other international decisions. 83 Part V examined the President's use of
his Commander-in-Chief powers.8 4 Finally, Part VI examined possible
defenses to an allegation that interrogation methods used by a
government official were in violation of the laws of the United States.8 5
Part I of the August 1, 2002 memorandum examined the history
and text of the criminal statute as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and
2340A. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 defines torture as "an act committed by a
person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or
physical control. 8 6 18 U.S.C. § 2340A lays out the offense of torture as
[w]hoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life.8 7
Thus, as the Department of Justice memorandum illustrates, in
order to be convicted of torture under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A, it

79. Priest, supra note 74.
80. Id.
81. Gonzales Aug. 1,2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 1-2.

82.
83.
84.
85.

1d.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.

86.
87.

18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000).
Id. § 2340A.
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must be shown that (1) the torture happened outside the United States or
any area within United States jurisdiction; (2) the defendant acted under
the color of law; (3) the victim suffering the torture was under the
complete physical control of the defendant; (4) the defendant
specifically intended to cause severe pain and suffering (either physical
or mental); and (5) severe pain or suffering was endured as a result of
the defendant's act. 88 The Office of Legal Counsel only addressed the
fourth and fifth elements at the request of Alberto Gonzales, so only a
discussion of "specific intent" and "infliction of pain and suffering"
appeared in the memorandum. 89
The Office of Legal Counsel determined that a person violates
§ 2340 if he "acts with the "express purpose of inflicting severe pain or
suffering." 90 Knowledge that a particular result is certain to occur does
not amount to specific intent. 9 1 So even if the defendant knows that
severe pain will result from his actions, he lacks the requisite specific
intent if causing the harm was not his objective.92 However, juries are
93
allowed to infer specific intent from the factual circumstances.
Therefore, even if the defendant has committed an act that he did not
intend to rise to the level of torture or cause the requisite pain and
suffering, the jury is still permitted to reach the conclusion that the
based on the circumstances of the action
defendant did intend to torture
94
committed by the defendant.
Part II of the August 1 memorandum examined the Torture
Convention itself.95 In short, the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that

the text of the Torture Convention only prohibits acts of the "most
extreme" nature by only affording punishment and penalties for acts of
torture while precluding such penalties for cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment. 96 The Torture Convention states that an individual must act
intentionally in committing torture, but this language could be
interpreted to only require general intent for violations. 97 The Office of
Legal counsel recognized this vagueness of the treaty and reached its

88.

Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supranote 8, at 3.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 4.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at4.

94.

Id. at 5.

95.
96.

See generally id. at 5.
Id. at 1-2.

97. Id. at 3-4.
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own conclusion that the "better interpretation" is that the phrase
"intentionally" created a specific intent-type standard. 98
It appears quite obvious that the Torture Committee did not intend
for only a specific intent standard. However, interpreting the Torture
Convention as such allows the government to benefit from this
vagueness. The Bush Administration's understanding of the phrase
"intentionally" represents an explanation of how the United States
intended to implement the Torture Convention.9 9 This type of
interpretation could eliminate liability on the part of the administration
since the requisite level of intent is not met according to the language of
the Torture Convention.100 If, on the other hand, the Convention
established a general intent standard, then the Bush administration's
understanding represents a modification of the obligation undertaken by
Bowden refers to as
the United States.10 1 This distinction is what Mark
' 2
the difference between "torture" and "coercion." 10
To justify this, the Office of Legal Counsel also concluded that the
Torture Convention defined a series of acts that states should "endeavor
to prevent, but need not criminalize."10 3 Subsequently, these acts are left
without the same penalties that torture confers.104 The Office of Legal
Counsel concluded that the Torture Convention's text, ratification
history, and negotiating history all confirm their belief that § 2340A
reaches only the most
heinous acts of torture, reserving criminal
05
penalties for such acts.
In Part III of the memorandum, the Office of Legal Counsel began
to question what conduct the U.S. courts would consider torture by
exploring the Torture Victims Protection Act of 2000 [hereinafter
"TVPA"] and the subsequent civil litigation that resulted under the Act.
The Office of Legal Counsel started TVPA case history analysis by
noting that the courts have not engaged in lengthy analysis of what
specific acts constitute torture, mainly because the cases brought under
the TVPA involved physical torture that, at times, was sadistic in

98. Seeid.at l5n.7.
99. Id.; see also BOULESBAA, supra note 46, at 20 (explaining that during the drafting of the
Torture Convention, the United States proposed to change the word "intentionally" to "deliberate"
or "malicious"; however, the proposal was not adopted since the United States was the only country
that was not satisfied with the word "intentionally").
100. Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 15 n.7.
101. Id.
102. Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation,ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 54.
103. Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 15.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 22.
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nature. 10 6 That being said, the government determined that courts
analyze the entire course of conduct as opposed to any single, specific
act, when deciding if torture had been committed. 10 7 Although this
approach makes it difficult to determine if any specific act constitutes
torture, certain single acts obviously do: severe beatings with
instruments, threats of imminent death, threats of removing extremities,
burning, electric shocks, or threats thereof, to genitalia, rape and other
forms of sexual assault, and forcing prisoners to watch torture of
others.10 8 This enumerated list of seven acts set a basis for the Office of
Legal Counsel to conclude that although it cannot be said with certainty
that acts falling short of these seven would not constitute torture under
§ 2340, it may be assumed that interrogation techniques would have to
be similar to the "extreme nature and in the type of harm caused in order
to violate the law."' 10 9
The Office of Legal Counsel then turned its attention to
10
international courts and their interpretation of what constitutes torture."
The government does recognize that these decisions are not binding on
United States law, but decided to analyze the decisions in order to
"provide guidance about how other nations will likely react to our
interpretation of the [Convention Against Torture] and Section 2340."' ' 1
Arguably, in doing this, the United States was again attempting to
measure what the permissible level of conduct is internationally in order
to develop a stratagem for the legal implications that may result from
crossing this threshold.
In Part IV of the memorandum, the Office of Legal Counsel
concluded that Western nations have generally used a high standard in
determining what methods employed during interrogation would violate
international prohibitions on torture." 2 They found that the decisions of
these Western courts allow for various aggressive interrogation methods
to, at worst, constitute cruel or inhuman punishment, but not rise to the
level of torture." 3 The Office of Legal Counsel pointed out, "[t]hese
decisions only reinforce our view that there is a clear distinction between
the two standards and that only extreme conduct, resulting in pain that is
of an intensity often accompanying serious physical injury, will violate
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
!d. at 27.

111.

Id.

112.
113.

Id.
Id.
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the latter."' 1 4 The Office of Legal Counsel believed that "they appear to
permit, under international law, an aggressive interpretation as to what
amounts to torture, leaving
that label to be applied only where extreme
' 15
circumstances exist." "
Part V of the memorandum examined the President's use of his
Commander-in-Chief powers." 6 Even in light of the Levin
Memorandum's apparent reversal of opinion discussed earlier," 7 the
President's Commander-in-Chief authority remains an issue of
controversy. This section of the memorandum starts off by reaching the
conclusion that "[e]ven if an interrogation method arguably were to
violate Section 2340A, the statute would be unconstitutional if it
impermissibly encroached on the President's constitutional power to
conduct a military campaign.' 118 This interpretation continues to echo
the dominating theme of this memorandum. The Office of Legal
Counsel searched for end ways around legal prohibitions against torture,
specifically at avoiding the domestic prohibitions against torture.
The Office of Legal Counsel reasoned that the Commander-inChief power gives the President constitutional authority to order
interrogations of enemy combatants in order to "gain intelligence,"
especially in the middle of a war where the United States has suffered a
first attack by an early aggressor. 19 If § 2340A was to be applied in any
way that would interfere with the power of the President in his "direction
of such core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy
combatants,"
such an application
of § 2340A would be
20
unconstitutional. 1

An analysis of the constitutionality of the President's Commanderin-Chief powers began with a retrospective look at the war with al
Qaeda. The Office of Legal Counsel started its analysis here because
although the request for legal advice "is not specifically limited to the
[war with al Qaeda] .. . it is useful to discuss this question [of the

President's war powers] within the context
al Qaeda terrorist network."' 121 (It should
Legal Counsel has reviewed and discussed
power to use force abroad in response to

of the current war against the
be noted that the Office of
the President's constitutional
the September 11th terrorist

114. Id.
115. Id. at 31.
116. Id.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 13-32.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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attacks, as well as the President's constitutional authority to deploy the
armed forces domestically to protect against foreign terrorist attacks in
two separate memoranda. 122)
After its discussion regarding the war with al Qaeda, the Office of
Legal Counsel turned its attention to the interpretation of the President's
Commander-in-Chief powers in order to avoid constitutional
problems. 123 In relying on Hamilton v. Dillin,124 the Office of Legal
Counsel reached the decision that the Supreme Court has "unanimously
stated that it is the Presidentalone who is constitutionally invested with
the entire charge of hostile operations" and that "the President enjoys
complete discretion in the exercise of his authority in conducting
operations against hostile forces."'' 25 In relying on the established canon
of construction that statutes are to be construed in a manner that avoids
constitutional difficulties so long as a reasonable alternative
interpretation is available, the Office of Legal Counsel believed that a
criminal statute will not be read as infringing on the President's ultimate
authority over the conduct of war.' 26 Congress lacks the power under
Article I of the Constitution to set terms and conditions under which the
President may exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief, so the
President's inherent constitutional authority must have greater weight
than § 2340A.' 2 7 Subsequently, § 2340A must be construed as
inapplicable to the interrogations and other acts undertaken by the
President pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority. 28 Without
question, the "other acts" language would cover acts of torture.
The Office of Legal Counsel completed its evaluation of the
Commander-in-Chief power by analyzing Congressional intent.
Although it could be argued that Congress enacted § 2340A with full
knowledge of the President's Commander-in-Chief power and intended
to restrict his discretion in the interrogation of enemy combatants, the
Office of Legal Counsel found that the Department of Justice still could
122. See generally Memorandum for Timothy E. Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President,
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: The
President'sConstitutionalAuthority to Conduct Military OperationsAgainst Terrorists and Nations
Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001).

123. Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supranote 8, at 33.
124. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 87 (1874) (affirming that the war power is vested in the
government and the President).
125. Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supranote 8, at 33-34.
126. Id. at 34.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 34-35; see also Memorandum for Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legislative Affairs, from Patrick F. Philibin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Re: Swift Justice Authorization Act (Apr. 8, 2002).
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not enforce § 2340A violations against federal officials acting pursuant
to the President's constitutional authority. 129 "One of the core functions
of the Commander-in-Chief is that of capturing, detaining, and
interrogating members of the enemy.... Any effort by Congress to
regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would violate the
Constitution's
sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the
130
President."'
Part VI of the memorandum discusses "justification defenses" that
may be available to officials tried for torture.' 3' These defenses would
"potentially eliminate criminal liability."1 32 It is within this sixth section
that the most controversial and egregious justification for torture can be
found. Prior to this section, the Office of Legal Counsel had construed
the definition of torture extremely narrowly, finding that § 2340 applies
only to the most extreme forms of physical and mental harm.133 This
sixth section takes the previous analysis one step further, reaching the
conclusion that "under current circumstances certain justification
defenses might be available that would potentially eliminate criminal
liability. Standard criminal law defenses of necessity and self-defense
could justify interrogation methods needed to elicit information to
prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United States and its
34
citizens."'1
The first defense the Office of Legal Counsel explored is that of
"necessity." 1 35 This is referred to as the "choice of evils"', 36 defense, and
is described as justifiable if the actor believes such conduct is necessary
to avoid harm to himself. 37 LaFave and Scott have described the
necessity defense as justifying the killing of one person to save two
others because "it is better that two lives be saved and one lost than that
two be lost and one saved."'' 38 The memorandum stated that this defense
may prove "especially relevant" in the current circumstances of fighting

129.

Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supranote 8, at 36.

130.

Id. at 38-39.

131.
132.
133.

Id. at 39.
Id.
Seeid. at31.

134. Id. at 39.
135.

Id.

136. It should be noted that the "choice of evils" defense has not been generally established by
any federal statute. However, the Supreme Court did recognize the defense in United States v.
Bailey, 44 U.S. 394 (1980).
137. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985).
138. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4 at

629 (1986).
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terrorism abroad. 139 The LaFave and Scott interpretation, sometimes also
described as achieving higher values at the cost of lesser values, 40 lays
the groundwork for the Central Intelligence Agency to torture captured
fighters in order to extract information that may possibly save the lives
of many more. 14' Liability can be avoided under necessity since "it is
better that two lives be saved and one lost than that two be lost and one
saved."' 142 "Therefore, the harm inflicted by necessity may include
intentional homicide, so long as the harm avoided is greater (i.e.,
preventing more deaths)."'' 43 The Office of Legal Counsel stipulated that
it appears that under certain circumstances, the necessity defense could
be successfully maintained in response to liability sought under
§ 2340A. 144 As the office went on to describe:
On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda launched a surprise covert attack on
civilian targets in the United States that led to the deaths of thousands
and losses in the billions of dollars. According to public and

governmental reports, al Qaeda has other sleeper cells within the
United States that may be planning similar attacks. Indeed, al Qaeda
plans apparently include efforts to develop and deploy chemical,

biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Under these
circumstances, a detainee may possess information that could enable
the United States to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or
surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm
that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance
compared to the harm avoided by preventing
such an attack, which
45
could take hundreds or thousands of lives. 1

Under the calculus described above, there are two factors the Office
of Legal Counsel believed could indicate when the necessity defense
could be invoked. 46 The first factor encompasses the degree of certainty
the official has that the detained individual possesses knowledge that
might prevent an attack. 147 The use of the word "may" in the phrase

139.

Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 40.

LAFAVE & SCOTT, supranote 138, at 629.
Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 40.
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 138, at 629. The Administration's view of the defense of
of evils" would be "it is better that thousands of lives be saved from a September 11 th type
terrorist attack and one lost to torture, than thousands of lives be lost in a terrorist attack because
one life was sparred by using legal interrogation techniques."
143. Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 40.
144. Id.
145. id. at40-41.
146. Id. at41.
147. Id.
140.
141.
142.
"choice
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"may possess information" 148 indicates that in almost all circumstances,
an official could logically conclude that the detainee "may" possess
information. In short, this allows for the necessity defense in virtually all
situations.
149
The second factor is the magnitude and likelihood of an attack.
However, there is still an important exception to the necessity defense. 50
The defense is only available in situations where specific legislation has
not determined values in the criminal statute.' 5' Subsequently, if
Congress has stated that a violation of a statute cannot be justified by the
harm avoided by the violation, then the necessity defense cannot be
proffered. 5 2 The Office of Legal Counsel has avoided this exception by
finding that Congress has not explicitly made a determination of values
with reference to torture. 53 "In fact, Congress explicitly removed efforts
to remove 54torture from the weighing of values permitted by the necessity
1
defense."'

The second defense explored by the Office of Legal Counsel is that
of self-defense. 155 The Office believed that even if a defendant could not
raise a necessity defense to an alleged violation of § 2340A, that official
would still have a self-defense claim.' 5 6 Under the current
circumstances, a defendant accused of torture could properly claim the
defense of another. 157 The memorandum states that if an attack appears
likely, but the intelligence agency and armed forces cannot prevent it
without information derived from interrogation, then the more likely it
will appear that the conduct in question will
be necessary and a self158
used.
be
could
applicable,
if
defense claim,
The legal assertions regarding the permissible boundaries of
interrogation techniques addressed to the administration did not end with
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151.

LAFAVE & SCOTr, supranote 138, at 629.

152. Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 41.
153.

Id.

154. Id. at 41 n.23. The Office of Legal Counsel describes that in the Convention Against
Torture, torture is defined as the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering "for such purpose[]
as obtaining from him ... information." Id. The Office then argues one could find that such a
definition represented an attempt to indicate that the good of obtaining information could never be
justified by torture. However, in enacting § 2340 (which codified the Torture Convention),
Congress removed the purpose element in the definition, therefore allowing the necessity defense to
apply when appropriate. Id.
155.

Id. at 42.

156.

Id.

157.

Id. at 43.

158. Id. at 43-44.
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this memorandum. As noted, a series of memoranda1 59 were written after
August 1, 2002 dealing with various issues. 60 However, the next highly
controversial memorandum to be written was a Defense Department
Working Group Paper on operational considerations, released on March
6, 2003. The theme of this Draft Report followed similar arguments and
employed much of the same legal reasoning of the above discussed
Office of Legal Counsel memorandum, specifically how to avoid
prosecution if charged with torture.
B.

The March 6, 2003 Defense Department Working Group PaperA Discussion

The second memorandum to be discussed was written on March 6,
2003 and entitled "Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on
Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational
Considerations.,16 1 This draft report offered arguments as to how U.S.
government officials who tortured prisoners could avoid prosecution if
caught.162 It was addressed to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
and was classified by Secretary Rumsfeld. 163 The Draft Report was
written by an ad hoc group of lawyers chosen by Secretary Rumsfeld,
"mostly political appointees in the Defense and other departments, to
advise him on interrogation techniques for prisoners at Guantanamo
Bay."' 64 It relied on much of the legal reasoning laid out in the 2002
Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum that covered the treatment of
detainees.1 65 As such, this Note will only discuss this memorandum's
interpretation of the relevant international law that governs
interrogations and how the United States would presumably apply the
relevant international law.
This Draft Report, in large part, interpreted "the requirements of
international law as it pertains to the Armed Forces of the United
States.' 66 The memorandum recognized that other nations and
international bodies (mainly the United Nations and the International

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See National Security Archive, supra note 11.
See id.
See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9.
Id.
Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 15, 2004, at 4.
Id.
Id.; see also Priest, supra note 74.
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
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restrictive view of the interpretations
Court of Justice) may take a more
67

made throughout the document. 1
The memorandum begins with a discussion of the Geneva
Conventions and the Convention Against Torture.' 68 The law of war
contained in the Third Geneva Convention highlights the obligations
relevant to the issue of interrogation. 169 However, as the memorandum
noted, the United States government has taken the position that the
provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of
prisoners do not apply to the al Qaeda detainees because al Qaeda is not
a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention. 70 Furthermore,
although the provisions of the Geneva Convention do apply to the
Taliban, Taliban detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. 17' Additionally, the Fourth
72
Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian personnel' in a
73
time of war does not apply to unlawful combatants either. 1 The March
Draft Report went on to state the United States did, indeed, ratify the
Torture Convention in 1994, but did so with numerous reservations and
understandings that are applicable to the circumstances described and
evaluated in the report. 174 As a result, the Torture Convention prohibits
torture only as defined in the U.S. understanding and prohibits cruel,
treatment or punishment only to the extent of
inhuman, and degrading
75
reservations.1
the
In Article 1 of the Torture Convention, which defines what
constitutes torture, the United States conditioned its ratification of the
treaty on the understanding that torture would mean (among other
things) "severe physical or mental pain or suffering."' 7 6 Article 2 of the
Convention which requires parties to "take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial and other measures to prevent ...torture" was
believed by the United States to be adequately covered with existing
federal and state criminal law.' 77 Subsequently, the United States passed
167.
168.

Id.
Id.

169.

See Geneva Convention (Ill) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,

1949, 20 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
170. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
171. Id.

172. See Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Feb. 2, 1956).
173. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supranote 9, at 4.

174. Id.
175. Id. at 6.
176. Id. at4.
177. Id. at 5.
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no further legislation. 78 Article 3 of the Convention disallows the
expulsion of a person to a nation-state "where there are substantial
grounds for believing that [the person] would be in danger of being
subjected to torture."' 179 The United States understood this as applying
only in situations where it is "more likely than not" a person would be
tortured. 80 In Article 5, jurisdiction over acts of torture must be
established. 18 "Chapter 113C of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides
federal criminal jurisdiction over an extraterritorial act or attempted act
of torture if the offender is a U.S. national."'182 In addition to torture, the
Torture Convention also prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment or punishment within the territories under a signatories'
jurisdiction. 83 However, the Draft Report believed that since the United
States found the meaning of the term "degrading treatment" to be vague
and ambiguous, there is a reservation imposed on this article that binds
the United States from refraining from any treatment only to the extent
that the treatment would be inhuman, cruel, or degrading under the Fifth,
Eighth, and 84 Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.1
The Draft Report next considered customary international law and
domestic law. The Department of Justice began by concluding that
"customary international law cannot bind the President under the
Constitution since it is not federal law."' 85 Any decision handed down
by the President in regard to al Qaeda prisoners would constitute a
controlling executive interest, hence overriding any customary
international law. 186 This further expands on the Department of Justice
2002 Memorandum's conclusion that the President's power is unbridled
and any decision handed down by him (presumably regarding the use of
torture) would be valid.
Turning to domestic law, specifically the codification of the Torture
Convention in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, the memorandum first defined
torture as any "act committed by a person acting under the color of law
178.

Id.

179. Torture Convention, supra note 41, at pt. I, art. 3, § 1; see also WORKING GROUP REPORT,
supra note 9, at 5; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 43, at 49-52.
180. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.

181.

Id.

182.

Id.

183. Id.at 6.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes II General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to
al Qaeda and TalibanDetainees at 32 (Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with author)).
186.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
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specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain" occurring
"outside the United States."' 187 The memorandum next determined that
under maritime law, the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station is included
within United States jurisdiction. 188 Because of this, the Torture
Convention and its proscriptions would not apply to the detainees since
United States as the
Guantanamo is not outside the territory of 8the
9
Torture Convention requires for applicability. 1
The Defense Department Report continued to examine various
subjects originally covered by the August 2002 memorandum but also
introduced some novel ideas such as that "the administration of drugs to
prisoners would violate a prohibition on disrupting 'profoundly the sense
or personality' of a prisoner only if it produced 'an extreme effect' and
was calculated to do so."' 90 However as stated earlier, the remainder of
this memorandum, while important in its own right, is not applicable to
the issues of this Note.
Having now examined exactly what these two controversial
documents cover, the theme behind them, as well as the legal reasoning
and principle employed throughout the two documents, it is important to
evaluate the memoranda to determine if the United States is advocating
for a strategy that bypasses our international obligation prohibiting the
use of torture as contained in the Torture Convention. Furthermore, if
the United States is engaging in such behavior, who, if anyone, would be
responsible for the violations in committing acts of torture.
IV.

EVALUATING THE Two MEMORANDA-IS THE UNITED STATES
ABIDING BY THE TORTURE CONVENTION,

AND IF NOT, WHO ISRESPONSIBLE?
"[P]risonersof war, some of whom are suspected of having killed or
attempted to kill Americans, should [not] be rewarded with
comforts .... However... [tihe inhumane treatment of prisoners,
whoever they are, is beneath a great nation. It is also illegal. 1
-Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator

187. Id. at 7; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000).
188. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
189. Id.
190. Lewis, supra note 163.
191. Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy: Torture Is a Crime (Mar. 13, 2003), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/foreign%20policy/torture032103.html (last visited May 25, 2005).
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The underlying theme and tone of these memoranda is the
avoidance of prosecution for egregious acts that cross the threshold of
torture. The August 2002 document claims that officials who put
physical pressure on detained fighters or other captives can literally
escape any sort of punishment or liability under § 2340A if they can
show that they lacked the requisite intent to cause "severe physical or
mental pain or suffering."' 192 If the defendant acted in good faith, any socalled torturous acts committed by him would not amount to the acts
prohibited by statute, hence he could negate a showing of specific
intent. 193 Torture, as defined in the relevant parts of § 2340, only covers
extreme acts that result in severe pain. 194 Additionally, the Memorandum
makes the claim that severe mental pain can only arise from the
predicate acts specifically listed in § 2340.195 There are acts that may be
cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but these are not the same as torturous acts
and do not rise to the level to be included as torture despite the fact these
same acts may constitute torture on other international legal
jurisdictions.' 96 Lastly, any implementation of § 2340A in respect to
interrogations is unconstitutional if those interrogations were undertaken
pursuant to the Constitutional grant of power to the President in his
Commander-in-Chief powers.197
The March 6, 2003 Draft Report echoes a similar theme to that of
the 2002 Memorandum. In short, the arguments made in the portions of
this Draft Report detail how the Bush administration rationalized that
compliance with international treaties and U.S. laws prohibiting torture
could be overlooked because of legal technicalities and national security
needs. 98 The Report's conclusion is that the Geneva Convention dealt
only with states, and al Qaeda was not a state or nation. 199 Furthermore,
the Taliban soldiers were a "'failed state' whose territory had been
largely overrun and held by violence by a militia or faction rather than
by a government." 200 This determination made by the Draft Report
comports with President Bush's finding that the Geneva Conventions did

192.
193.

Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 3; see also Lewis, supra note 163.
Gonzales Aug. 1, 2002 Memo, supra note 8, at 3-4.

194. Id. at 4.
195. Id.
196.
197.
198.
2004, at

Id.
Id.
Jess Bravin, Pentagon Report Set Framework For Use of Torture, WALL ST. J., June 7,
Al; see also Priest & Smith, supra note 73 (discussing inapplicability during war,

interrogations, and conduct of U.S. personnel outside of United States territory)
199.
200.

Lewis, supra note 163.
Id.; see WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9.
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not cover the prisoners held at Guantanamo. Shortly after January 29,
0
2002, President Bush classified them as "unlawful combatants., 1
Likewise, soon after the Draft Report was written in March, 2003,
William J. Haynes II, the Pentagon's top lawyer, wrote a letter to
Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, in April,
2003, discussing America's position on human rights and its opposition
to torture. 20 2 Throughout the letter, Haynes used the term "enemy
combatants" to describe those in custody as a result of the war on
terror.2 °3
It is the government's position that once someone has been properly
designated as such, that person can be held indefinitely until the end of
America's war on terrorism or until the military determines on a case
by case basis that the particular
detainee no longer poses a threat to the
20 4
United States or its allies.
There seems to be specific motivation for this labeling of detainees
as "enemy combatants" or "unlawful combatants." By calling these
detainees "enemy combatants" instead of "prisoners of war," the
detainees are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention
which would prohibit physical and mental torture of prisoners of war, as
well as any other form of coercion, even if it is only unpleasant or
disadvantageous treatment. 2 05 Detainees who are United States citizens
have the protections of the Constitution and cannot be detained without
charges or be denied their right to legal counsel.20 6 They also are
protected under the Eighth Amendment.20 7 Consider the case of Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld 20 8 decided by the Supreme Court in June, 2004.
After Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force,
the President ordered the Armed Forces to Afghanistan to "subdue 20al9
Qaeda and quell the Taliban regime that was known to support it."

Yaser Hamdi was an American citizen whom the Government had
classified as an "enemy combatant" for allegedly fighting alongside the
Taliban during the conflict.
According to U.S. officials, Hamdi
201. Lewis, supra note 163.
202. Bowden, supra note 102.
203. Id.
204. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (D.D.C. 2005).
205. Bowden, supra note 102.

206. Id.
207. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII; see also Bowden, supra note 102.
208. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).

209. Id. at 2635.
210. Id. at 2635-36.
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surrendered to the Northern Alliance while fighting on behalf of the
Taliban during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. 21 1 After being seized,
he was detained at a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina for nearly
two and a half years without access to attorneys or without charges being
filed against him.2 12 Hamdi's father filed a habeas petition on his behalf
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 alleging, among other things, that the
Government held his son in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.213 Under the Geneva Convention, the United States
government was required to release its prisoners of war upon the defeat
of the Afghan government.2 14 Instead, the government classified all
Taliban soldiers, "by virtue of having fought for [a] government that had
effectively conspired to commit a terrorist act," as enemy combatants in
the U.S. government's ongoing "war on terrorism., 21 5 The United States
claimed that such a designation entitled them to withhold any protections
afforded by due process of law, right to counsel, habeas corpus, and the
other guarantees enumerated in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.2 16
The Fourth Circuit found that because it was undisputed that Hamdi
was captured in an active combat zone in Afghanistan, Hamdi does not
have a right to a factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing allowing him to
217
be heard or to rebut the Government's assertions. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that assuming express congressional authorization
of the detention was required by 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which provides
that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress," the postSeptember 11 Authorization for Use of Military Force provided the
authorization for Hamdi's detention.2 18 The Court also stated that
[t]he privilege of citizenship ... entitles Hamdi to a limited judicial
inquiry into his detention, but only to determine its legality under the
war powers of the political branches.... [T]he Constitution does not
review of the factual determinations
entitle him to a searching
219
underlying his seizure.

211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 2636.
Id.
Id.

215. Jacob G. Homberger, The Hamdi Case Mocks Justice, Future of Freedom Foundation
(Oct. 4, 2004), availableat http://www.fff.org/comment/com0410a.pdf.
216. Id.
217. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at2638.
218. Id. at 2638.
219. Id. at 2639.
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The Supreme Court then vacated the judgment and remanded the
case. 220 The Court concluded "that a citizen-detainee seeking to
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice
of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut
' 22
the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. 1
Although the Supreme Court decided that Hamdi could not be held
indefinitely without some access to the legal system, it did not clarify
how the Authorization for Use of Military Force was to be
implemented.2 22 The decision only provided a "nebulous admission" that
the concept of habeas corpus, in principle, exists.223 The Pentagon and
Department of Justice decided to release Hamdi.2 24 The Supreme Court's
decision did not order the government to release Hamdi. Instead, it
ordered that the government simply had to provide Hamdi with a hearing
so that the courts could determine how to proceed. A criminal indictment
of Hamdi would by its very nature give jurisdiction over Hamdi to the
U.S. federal court system.225 This would undermine the Pentagon's
claim of power to label and punish "enemy combatants" without judicial
interference. Furthermore, "[p]rosecuting Hamdi would have enabled the
federal judiciary to directly rule that the invasion of Afghanistan was
226
unlawful under the... Constitution."
Although Hamdi was a citizen of the United States, the vast
majority of the thousands of detainees are not American citizens, nor are
they considered prisoners of war, despite the fact that they were captured
during the fighting in Afghanistan. These detainees are only afforded the
protections of the United States international agreements.2 27 These
international agreements and treaties, even if valid, are in effect,
unenforceable. 228 There are no proficient ways of enforcing breaches of
international covenants. 229 To classify all prisoners detained at
Guantanamo as "unlawful combatants" was an extraordinary exercise of

220. Id.
221. Id. at 2648.
222. See id.; see also Mike Whitney, Hamdi 's DeportationCase, Znet: Repression Watch (Oct.
13,
2004),
available
at
http://www.zmag.org/content/print-article.cfm?itemID=6403&
sectionID=43.
223. Whitney, supra note 222.
224. Homberger, supra note 215.

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Bowden, supranote 102.
228. Id.; see also JANIS & NOYES, supra note 5.
229. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 5, at 260-313. The International Court of Justice is the
regulatory arm of international agreements, and it lacks power to enforce decisions. Id.
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unilateral judgment.23 ° Without implementing a formal fact finding
process through the use of a tribunal or other like hearing, it could be
literally impossible to know if all detainees were, in fact, harboring
terrorism. 231 To illustrate this point, consider the findings of the military
tribunals conducted in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. A total of 1,196
hearings were conducted before military tribunals.2 32 Of those, nearly
seventy-five percent of prisoners, a total of 886,233 were found to be
innocent civilians picked up in the wide sweeps by the military forces.234
were freed.235 A total of 310 detainees
Subsequently, those civilians
236
status.
were granted POW
In the present situation at Guantanamo, the Bush administration has
ignored international law, U.S. military regulations, and longstanding
U.S. practice by making the "blanket determination that all persons held
at Guantanamo Bay were 'unlawful combatants' and were not entitled to
the protections due prisoners of war or protected persons under the
Geneva Conventions."' 237 Since the Court ruled in June that these
detainees have a right to challenge their incarceration, the hearings have
been criticized as not meeting the traditional standards of normal habeas
court proceedings.238 The detainees are not afforded legal aid during the
proceedings, nor are they allowed to see much of the evidence before
them.2 3 9 These hearings (or "combatant status review tribunals" as they
are officially called) were devised and initiated just weeks after the
decision was handed down, and as such were not structured with great
care. 240 The administration, however, believes in the tribunals'

230.

Lewis, supra note 163.

231.

Id. Even suspected terrorists are protected by the Convention Against Torture. See J.

Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius's The United Nations Convention Against Torture, supra note

43 at 69-70, for a discussion of the various manifestations of the Torture Convention beginning with
the Swedish draft until its final adoption in 1984. A common theme throughout all drafts was its
applicability to "a person" and not limiting the proscription to those who are not accused of a
malicious act. This is the premise behind not allowing a statement made under duress of torture to
be used as evidence. Id.
232. Human Rights Watch, United States: Guantanamo Two Years On: U.S. Detentions
Undermine the Rule of Law (Jan. 9, 2004), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/09/

usdom6917.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Watch]; see also Lewis, supranote 163.
233. Human Rights Watch, supranote 232.
234. Lewis, supra note 163.
235. Id.
236. Human Rights Watch, supranote 232.
237. Id.
238. Neil A. Lewis, Guantanamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at Al.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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effectiveness, arguing in federal court that the tribunals more than satisfy
the Supreme Court's ruling. 241 However, the inadequacies that the
administration denies are evident. So far, 320 detainees have appeared
before the tribunals and out of the 104 which the Pentagon has passed
final judgment on, 103 were found to have been properly detained as
unlawful enemy combatants.2 42 On the other hand, if complete
individualized determinations of status are conducted before tribunals,
the likely outcome would be: first, that many may be neither Taliban nor
al Qaeda fighters; and second, that the Taliban fighters, as members of
the regular armed forces of the then-government of Afghanistan, are
entitled to prisoner of war status. 243 Instead, the U.S. government has
"sought to avoid the prohibition in international human rights law
against prolonged, indefinite detention by claiming that terrorist suspects
are combatants in the war against terrorism. ' 244 The laws of war permit
the detention of captured combatants until the end of hostilities so the
Administration has developed a loosely framed "war on terror" without a
clear end.245 Subsequently, Guantanamo detainees could effectively be
held indefinitely.246
Because of this, there may be specific reasons why the United
States has utilized the naval and military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
as the facility to house detained Afghani fighters. 47 The United States
base in Guantanamo Bay is controlled and run by means of a long-term,
multi-year lease with the Cuban government. 248 Previous case law 249 has
held that United States-leased territories are not within the sovereignty
of the United States and subsequently, the United States federal courts
do not have extraterritorial jurisdiction in these lands.250 That being said,
the March 6, 2003 Draft Report elicits another interpretation of

241. Id.
242. Id. These detainees will have another chance at appealing their detention on the grounds
they no longer pose a threat. Id.
243. Human Rights Watch, supra note 232.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. van der Vyver, supra note 39, at 446.
248. Id.
249. In Cuban American Bar Ass' v. Christopher, the Eleventh Circuit held that migrants at
Guantanamo Bay had no legal rights in the United States judicial system. 43 F.3d 1412, 1429-30
(1 th Cir. 1995). Moreover, in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, the Court held that since Bermuda
was leased by the United States from Great Britain, it fell under the sovereignty of Great Britain.
335 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1948).
250. van der Vyver, supra note 39, at 446.
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Guantanamo "ownership" put forth by the government that is as
ingenious as it is troubling.25 1
The federal statute against torture is limited to acts committed
"outside the United States. 252 The 2003 Draft Report argues that the
Guantanamo Bay naval base "is included within the definition of the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," so
torture that took place at those facilities would not be covered by the
prohibitions set forth in § 2340A. 253 However, in the Guantanamo cases
presently before the Supreme Court and as described above, the Bush
administration has vigorously defended the opinion that is, in short, the
opposite view they have taken in the Draft Report: Guantanamo is under
Cuban sovereignty and hence is outside all jurisdictional reach of United
States courts to hear a case brought before them.254 This is the epitome
of a double standard being used to justify the Bush administration's
objectives. This trend of not extending jurisdiction to United States
controlled territories continued to be implemented in the cases of
Guantanamo detainees until the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v.
Bush,255 which finally ended this argument, holding in part that
Guantanamo Bay is within the jurisdiction of federal courts.
In Rasul v. Bush,256 decided on June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court
took a major step in affirming the rights of enemy combatants held by
the United States government in the post-September 11 war on
terrorism. 257 The core question before the Court was whether noncitizens classified as enemy combatants and being detained at
Guantanamo Bay had the right to file petitions for writs of habeas
corpus. 258 The Supreme Court decided two primary issues, with Justice
Stevens writing the majority opinion. First, no distinction can be made
between a citizen and a non-citizen held in custody and both have rights
to petition for a writ of habeas corpus.259 Second, the majority found that
Guantanamo Bay is within the jurisdiction of federal courts, entitling the
2 60
non-citizens detained there to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
251.

Lewis, supra note 163.

252.

18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000).

253.

WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.

254. Lewis, supranote 163.
255. 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004).
256. Id.
257.

Muzaffar Chishti, US Supreme CourtAffirms Rights of Non-Citizen Detainees,Migration

Information

Source

(Aug.

1,

2004),

at

http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/

display.cfm?id=245.
258. Rasul, 124 S.Ct. at 2690.
259. Id. at 2698-99.

260. Id. at 2696.
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As this Note has discussed above, it had been the administration's
position that the federal judiciary's reach does not extend to
Guantanamo Bay because it is outside the "sovereign territory" of the
United States. In rejecting that argument, the Court held that federal
judicial review applies to Guantanamo Bay, since it is a territory in
which the United States exercises261plenary and exclusive jurisdiction,
even if not "ultimate sovereignty.,
The Court found support for its analysis in history.262 The writ has
"root[s] deep into the genius of our common law.... [and has become]
an integral part of our common law heritage., 263 The Rasul ruling is
limited to the treatment of non-citizens held as "enemy combatants."
Nevertheless, the decision handed down sets an important precedent for
the rights of all non-citizens detained by the United States
government.26 4 That being said, "[i]t remains unclear whether the court's
ruling in the Rasul case applies to detention of non-citizens" by the
United States in other foreign locations outside of Guantanamo Bay.265
In analyzing Scalia's dissent, it seems logical that the Supreme Court's
decision does indeed extend to all non-citizens detained by the
government. "In abandoning the venerable statutory line... the Court
boldly extends the scope of the habeas statute to the four corners of the
earth. 266
The next series of cases dealing with the issue of whether or not
detainees should be afforded a tribunal to determine their status started
in an order dated August 17, 2004, in which Judge Kessler designated
Judge Joyce Hens Green to coordinate and manage all proceedings in the
cases dealing with the right to tribunal, and to render decisions in those
proceedings.267 On September 15, 2004, an Executive Session
Resolution further clarified that Judge Green would "identify and
delineate both procedural and substantive issues common to all or some
of these cases and, as consented to by the transferring judge in each case,
rule on common procedural issues. 268 The resolution also stated that a
transferring judge could resolve the issue on her own if that judge
deemed it appropriate. 269 This is what happened in the consolidated
261. Id. at 2693, 2696, 2698-99.
262. Id. at 2696-97.
263.
264.

Id. at 2692.
Chishti, supra note 257.

265. Id.
266.
267.
268.

Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,451 (D.D.C. 2005).
Id.

269. Id.
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cases of Khalid v. Bush2 7 ° and Boumedeine v. Bush.27' On January 19,
under
2005, Judge Leon found that there is "no viable legal theory
272
international law by which a federal court could issue a writ."
On January 31, 2005, Judge Green issued a Memorandum
Opinion 27 3 that applied to eleven other cases involving detainees' right
to a tribunal, cases which had been transferred to her. 274 She ruled, in
part, that the Bush administration must allow prisoners at Guantanamo
to contest their detention in U.S. courts, concluding that special military
reviews established by the Pentagon as an alternative are illegal. 275 Judge
Green's ruling directly conflicts with the one issued by Judge Leon
described above. 276 Judge Green's decision even went "beyond the
question of whether detainees had rights and found the 'combatant status
review tribunals' illegal. 277 These split decisions inevitably mean that
the conflict over tribunals will now head to higher courts.278 Still, Judge
Green's decision was a legal victory for the detainees and underscored
the ongoing legal battle over how to implement the Supreme Court's
ruling in Rasul v. Bush 279 that gave the detainees the right to contest U.S.
accusations and challenge their indefinite detentions in United States
courts.2

8°

Assuming for the moment that the arguments set forth thus far are
correct, and the assertions made in the various memoranda advocating
the expansion of interrogation techniques and permissible forms of
questioning that the administration has classified as non-torture are
illegal under domestic or international law, who then may be held
responsible? The August 2002 Bybee Memorandum, arguing that the
President could order the use of torture, was addressed to the White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales. 281 This begs the question as to what
action, if any, did President Bush take as a result of the suggestion
270. 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
271. Id.
272. Id.at 330.
273. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 452. Her opinion combined the 11
cases before her. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.at 481.
276. Carol D. Leonnig, Judge Rules Detainee Tribunals Illegal, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at
AO1.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004).
280. Leonnig, supra note 276.
281. Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R.
Gonzales Counsel to the President at 1 (August 1, 2002) (on file with author).
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relayed by the Justice Department? Anthony Lewis has suggested that
one possibility is that the President, advised by the Office of Legal
Counsel that he had full discretion to disregard legal prohibitions on
torture, delegated power to Rumsfeld and Tenet to use means of
extracting information from detainees that would directly conflict with
the laws prohibiting torture.282 This theory could help explain the
reasons for Secretary Rumsfeld to authorize illegal interrogation
techniques and personally approve the use of those techniques in
December 2002, which is the controversy surrounding the Ali v.
Rumsfeld case addressed earlier. 283 The Supreme Court is currently faced
284
with deciding the extent to which presidential power can reach.
Nonetheless, historically, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
during times in which the
challenge executive assertions of power
285
United States has been involved in a war.
"When a violation of international law occurs, there are
286
consequences for the government that has committed" the violation.
Despite the assertions made in the August 2002 Department of Justice
Memorandum, there is the real possibility that agents of that government
will be held personally liable for acts of torture carried out under the
government's order or command.287 Furthermore, the responsibility of
the government attaches to the State itself.288 In January 2005, Army
Reserve Spc. Charles Graner took the stand to testify in the penalty
phase of his court martial on charges of abusing detainees at Abu Ghraib
prison289 At a minimum, seven of the ten jurors, four officers and six
enlisted personnel, had to agree before convicting Graner on each
count. 290 After deliberating, the jury convicted on two counts of
conspiracy, including photographing a detainee being dragged by
another guard; one count of dereliction of duty for failing to protect
282. Lewis, supra note 163.
283. See supra note 37.
284. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711
(2004).

285. Lewis, supra note 163.
286. NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 96
(1987). See generally JANIS & NOYES, supra note 5, at 20-86 for a discussion and examples of
treaties.
287. RODLEY, supra note 286, at 96; see also BOULESBAA, supra note 46, at 25 (describing
that the United States took the position that Article I of the Torture Convention applied to acts
carried out when the person was in the government's custody or physical control).
288. RODLEY, supra note 286, at 96.
289. Susan Candiotti & Jim Polk, Abuse 'Ringleader' Awaits Sentence, CNN.com, Jan. 18,
2005, at http://www.cnn.com20O5fLAW/O1/l4/graner.court.martiaV.
290. Id.
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prisoners from abuse, cruelty and maltreatment; four counts of
maltreatment of detainees; one count of aggravated assault, for striking a
detainee with an expandable baton, causing him to cry out; one count of
an indecent act; and a lesser charge in the alleged beating of a Syrian
inmate. 29 1 According to the defense put forward in the case, Graner was
instructed by military intelligence officers to "rough up" inmates in
order to extract information.2 92 Graner is not the first or last to be
charged despite claims by the Department of Justice that agents acting in
official capacity would be shielded from prosecution from charges of
torture.293 While a state will be held liable when an individual acting on
the state's behalf commits a proscribed act of torture, an interesting
question arises when an individual commits an act of torture when he is
not acting in official capacity or when he is not acting on behalf of the
government. The Torture Convention does not apply to private
individuals not acting on behalf of the government. 294 This obviously
limits not only the scope of the Convention, but also its effectiveness.2 95
International law prohibits the use of torture for any and all
purposes. Additionally, responsibility will attach to actors engaged in
torturous activities. Conversely, there are theories that exist which
justify and advocate for the use of torture in certain situations. Although
these uses of torture are illegal under the applicable treaties and
international agreements, as well as the legal and moral principles raised
in this Note, the Torture Memoranda written on behalf of the
Administration advocate for a few justifiable uses of torture.
V.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TORTURE AND EFFECTS OF A SHIFT IN POLICY

"The United States must defend liberty and justice because these
principles are right and truefor allpeople everywhere ....296
-United States NationalSecurity Strategy, September 2002
Justification for the use of torture will inevitably give rise to
feverish controversy among the people and nations of the world,
regardless of their ideological or political beliefs. Justifications such as

291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
Id.
BOULESBAA, supra note

46, at 39.

295. Id.

296.

THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 3 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
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those set out in the Torture Memoranda seem to be saying that torture
and other ill treatment against persons may, in certain circumstances, be
justifiable despite the fact that treaty obligations prohibit torture and ill
treatment "in absolute terms and permitted no derogation ...even in

time of war or other public emergency threatening the life [or viability]
of the nation.', 297 However, as the European Commission on Human
Rights asked in the case of. Ireland v. United Kingdom,298 is the
prohibition against torture "an absolute one, or [are] there ... special

circumstances, such as those existing in the present case, in which
treatment contrary to Art. 3 [such as torture or other similar acts] may be
justified or excused"? 299 The Commission concluded that the prohibition
"is an absolute one and that there can never be under the [Geneva]
Convention or under international law, a justification for acts in breach
of' the provisions that absolutely
prohibit the use of torture and other
300
like treatments against people.
As Nigel S. Rodley points out, the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights retraction of the "relevance of the notion of
justifiability" seems to be effective, yet the Commission's "formulation
extent" as to the lengths of a so-called
still begs the question to some
30
1
torture.
against
prohibition
There are two theories that justify the use of torture which seem to
be the most relevant and that seem to play a role in strategies of
permissible interrogation techniques advocated by the Torture
Memoranda. These two principles coincide with the objectives the
United States government has explored in the memoranda. These two
theories are the "Utilitarian Principle" and "Customary Use of Torture."
A.

The UtilitarianPrinciple-Allowablefor the "GreaterGood"

Justification under the utilitarian principle centers on the notion that
harsh treatment is warranted in order to elicit information that may save
others from future harms.30 2 This principle has been advanced in a
number of cases, although the argument has never been made by a

297.

RODLEY, supra note 286, at 74.

298. 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv.on H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) 512, 750; see also van der Vyver,
supra note 39, at 447; RODLEY, supra note 286, at 74-75.
299.

Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) 512,

750.
300. Id. at 752.
301.

RODLEY, supra note 286, at 75.

302. Id.; see also van der Vyver, supranote 39, at 453-54.
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government.30 3 Nevertheless, the utilitarian principle of torture has a
sufficient enough following to merit serious attention.3 °4
Proponents of the utilitarian reasoning often demonstrate the
impossibility of confining such a principle merely to the "lesser evil for
the greater good., 30 5 If torture is used under the premise of necessity,
there is nothing that will stop it from being used on the grounds of
expediency later on. 30 6 It will soon become a "slippery slope"; the
incorporation of justifiable torture under the utilitarian principal would
of the absolute prohibition against torture
undercut every formulation
30 7
and other ill treatment.
It can be argued that a utilitarian principle for torture may be rooted
in the United States' Joint Resolution for the Authorization for Use of
Military Force, 308 which was passed in response to the terrorist attacks
on New York City and Washington D.C. This resolution appears to have
been based on the utilitarian thought. 30 9 In the Joint Resolution,
Congress gave the President authority to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
against the United
prevent any further acts of international terrorism
3
States by such nations, organizations, or persons. 10
This congressional resolution was unique in that it permitted the
President to engage the United States in hostilities without defining any
particular nation against whom the force of the armies should be
directed.3 1'

303. RODLEY, supranote 286, at 76.
304. See Michael Levin, The Casefor Torture, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1982, at 13.
305. RODLEY, supra note 286, at 76. "[H]ow many broken bodies equal how many lives? How
many broken wills to save a government?" Id
306. See W.L. Twining & P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 305, 345-46
(1973).
307. RODLEY, supranote 286, at 76.
308. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
309. Id.; see RODLEY, supra note 286.
310. Id.
311. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004).
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Allowable Under Customary InternationalLaw

It can also be argued that torture cannot possibly violate customary
international law. There are countless states that have violated human
312
rights and committed torture with impunity and without justification.
On the same token, there are also countless codes, statutes, rules of law,
treaties, and other documents to enforce human rights and guarantee that
they are not violated.3 1 3 The question becomes, how can a customary
international law prohibition be grounded in the practice of states if
these same states routinely engage in that practice? 3 14 Nigel S. Rodley
sums up the argument that torture has become a customary norm:
A number of writers have refuted this challenge, and it is not proposed
to rehearse the polemic in these pages. Suffice it to say that since
governments which practise torture not only do not seek to justify their
behaviour but in fact deny it vehemently, human rights violations in
the form of torture cannot be offered as evidence of state
practice.... As to the lack, or inadequacy, of enforcement machinery,
this can hardly be offered as proof that the rule requiring enforcement
does not exist. In fact, there has in the last two decades at the UN been
a burgeoning of newly created machinery, a trend that suggests slow,
and perhaps inadequate, but definite incremental steps towards more
effective implementation of human rights norms.315
In fact, since torture has been condemned by international
communities through the use of agreements and treaties, many
commentaries have now concluded that "customary international law...
prohibits [(not allows)] the use of torture by public officials. '3 16
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

"Man torturing man is afiend beyond description. You turn a corner in
the dark and there he is. You congeal into a bundle of inanimatefear.
You become the very soul of anesthesia.But there is no escaping him.

It is your turn now ....

,317

-Henry Miller

312.
RODLEY,
313.
314.
315.

Ralph G. Steinhardt, Book Review, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 387, 389 (2004) (reviewing
infra note 315).

Id.
Id.
NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-67

(2d ed. 1999).
316. GARCIA, supra note 40, at 1.
317.

COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 913 (1993).
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The legal and pragmatic issues regarding the legality of torture and
the subsequent legal protections of those who commit such acts that
have been raised by the sensational assertions contained in the various
memorandum officially released by the White House in June 2004 are
numerous and troubling. The current "war on terrorism," as defined by
the Executive Branch, has been used as a legal tool for expanding
executive power at the cost of domestic law, and even more importantly,
international law. These assertions contained in the aforementioned legal
Memoranda that the President has unconstrained constitutional power to
order the torture of prisoners despite statutes and treaties forbidding such
torture is another reach of presidential hegemony. 318 "The basic premise
of the American constitutional system is that those who hold power are
said, the United States is meant
subject to the law. As John Adams first
319
to be a government of laws, not men.'
The Supreme Court, in deciding the various detainee abuse cases
that are before it, could send a signal that there are limits to the
expansion of Presidential authority by finding that the Executive branch
overstepped constitutional bounds by detaining "combatants"
indefinitely without trial.32 ° Others may argue that the answer will have
to come from the political system by means of a congressional
investigation or via a joint investigation committee. 32' Even further,
some advocate for a criminal investigation by an independent prosecutor
with the power to subpoena. 322
International law specifically states that torture is a crime.323 It
flows logically that the crime of torture as defined internationally, in
treaties that we are signatories to and have ratified,324 should be identical
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See Lewis, supra note 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

323. van der Vyver, supra note 39, at 430, 453 (stating that "[tihe prohibition of torture in
international law knows no exceptions.").
324. The text of the Supremacy Clause would appear to dictate that treaties to which the United
States is a signatory should be regarded just as statutes passed by Congress and signed by the
president. "However, there is an important way in which treaties are not like U.S. statutes."
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (3d ed. 2002).

"U.S. courts have developed a doctrine that treaties may be either 'self-executing' or 'non-selfexecuting."' Id.; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). "A self executing
treaty becomes internal law in the United States immediately upon entry into force of the
agreement" by the United States. BUERGENTHAL & MURPHY, supra, at 191; see, e.g., Medellin v.
Dretke, No. 04-5928, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4344, at **43=44 (May 23, 2005); Cheung v. United States,
213 F.3d 82, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2000). "Non-self-executing treaties, however, require legislation to
implement them in the United States." Id "It is the implementing legislation, not the agreement
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to the domestic definition of torture. As this discussion has highlighted,
this does not seem to be the actual case.325 The United States has
implemented a definition of torture that is much narrower than the
definition contained in international law; subsequently expanding the
boundaries of what it feels is permissible behavior. The effect of
suggesting that torture may be permissible legally and morally could be
catastrophic. If the United States, unquestionably the strongest power in
the international community, is setting out to revamp human rights, what
implications will that have on the world? The need for stringent
boundaries of what is permissible treatment of prisoners under
international law is quickly becoming a pragmatic call for lawfulness in
an apparent crisis of lawlessness. The assertions set forth by the United
States in the Torture Memoranda unquestionably go against a call for
lawfulness.326 One thing is clear, however. Although the Justice
Department's December 30, 2004 revision 327 of the controversial August
1, 2002 Torture Memorandum, which "supersedes the August 2002
Memorandum in its entirety,"3 28 is a step in the right direction for the
administration to take, the Executive's intervention at this point in time
is rudimentary and leaves one to wonder what exactly the administration
hopes to achieve by the new memorandum.
Jonathan Canfield*

itself, that becomes" the binding law of U.S. courts. Id. at 191-92. As a practical matter, the United
States now dictates that all treaties signed are non-self-executing. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 5,
at 20-86 for a discussion and examples of treaties.
325. See van der Vyver, supra note 39, at 434-38.
326.

See discussion supraPart III.

327. See Levin Memorandum Dec. 30, 2004, supranote 13.
328. Id. at 2.
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